Comparative advantage and preferences in college admissions in Turkey  by Yuret, Tolga & Doğan, M. Kadir
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877–0428 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.04.016
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 15 (2011) 1862–1865
WCES-2011
Comparative advantage and preferences in college admissions in 
Turkey 
Tolga Yuret a *, M. Kadir Do÷an b
aIstanbul Technical University, Faculty of Management,Istanbul, 34367, Turkey 
bAnkara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara, 06590, Turkey 
Abstract 
Each year, approximately 2 million students compete for 200 thousand seats in Turkish colleges. The central authority takes 
students’ preferences and test scores into account and place students to the limited seats of majors in the colleges. Balinski and 
Sönmez (1999) note that the algorithm used in this process is college optimal and propose a student optimal algorithm to 
overcome some deficiencies. We use 2005 data–set and show that both algorithms generate almost the same results. This reveals 
the simple truth in student preferences: the students want to be in majors where their comparative advantages lay. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
The central college admissions authority (ÖSYM) conducts a college admissions examination (ÖSS) in June of 
every year in Turkey. After the test scores are revealed, the students fill out preference lists in which they rank 
majors in the colleges.  For instance, a student may rank economics in college X as his first choice, engineering in 
college Y as his second choice, etc.  To be concise, we refer to the majors in the colleges as “programs”.   
    ÖSS test has five components: Math, Turkish, Science, Social Science and Foreign Languages. All students 
can take all these components.  Four different types of test scores are computed by giving different weights to these 
components. Different majors take different types of test scores into account.  The test score types and examples to 
programs which respect to these test score types are as follows:  
1) A quantitative score (QS) is computed by giving a higher weight to math and science (e.g., engineering).  
2) An equally weighted score (EW) is computed by giving a higher weight to math and Turkish (e.g., economics).  
3) A verbal score (VS) is computed by giving a higher weight to Social Sciences and Turkish (e.g., history).  
4) A foreign language score (FL) is computed by giving a higher weight to Foreign Languages and Turkish (e.g., 
British Literature). 
All colleges use the same type of test score for the same major. For instance, economics majors in all colleges use 
the  EW score.  Each program has  a  limited  capacity.  ÖSYM uses  the  information  about  the  students’  test  scores,  
preferences and places students to the programs subject to their capacities. 
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Balinski and Sönmez (1999) note that ÖSYM uses a college optimal algorithm (COA) and propose a student 
optimal algorithm (SOA)2 to overcome some deficiencies such as inefficiency, vulnerability to manipulation, and 
the potential of penalizing students for improved test scores. They note that SOA is characterized as “best” in this 
context. Let's take the following example to show how these algorithms produce different placements. Let there be 
only two students, A and B, and only two programs with capacities one for each. First program is “science” which 
accepts students respecting QS and the second program is “economics” which accepts students respecting EW. Say, 
student A prefers to be an economist but has the highest score in QS, and student B prefers to be a scientist but has 
the  highest  score  in  the  EW.  Scoring  higher  in  the  QS  shows  a  comparative  advantage  in  becoming  a  scientist  
whereas scoring higher in the EW shows a comparative advantage in becoming an economist. The COA is more 
concerned about these comparative advantages than the preferences of the students. In this example, both student A 
and student B will be placed to their second choices by COA whereas they will be placed to their first choices by 
SOA.
In this paper, we use the Turkish student placement system data–set of year 2005 to compare the placements 
under these algorithms and show that these algorithms differ for just six students. This is just a tiny number given 
that almost 200 thousand students are being placed. The reason is simple: the colleges prioritize on the comparative 
advantages. The students prefer the programs where they have comparative advantages. In other words, students’ 
preferences and colleges’ priorities are on the same line. Therefore, it is not surprising that the college optimal and 
student optimal solution generate almost the same result. 
We introduce the COA and SOA algorithms in section 2. We introduce the data–set and examine the relationship 
between the comparative advantage and student preferences in section 3. Section 4 gives the concluding remarks. 
2. COA and SOA 
The descriptions and properties of the algorithms are given in detail by Balinski and Sönmez (1999). In this 
section, we will only describe how we apply these algorithms to the Turkish student placement system data–set of 
year 2005. The students have four types of test scores and can make 24 choices on 4022 different programs in their 
preference lists.3
   Placement with One Type:  The COA and SOA will generate the same results if there is only one test score 
type. Here is how the algorithms work with a single test type: First we sort the students with respect to their test 
scores. Then we start the highest scoring student and continue until we have the lowest scoring student and apply the 
following procedure: Place the student to his most favorable program given that the capacity of the program is not 
already filled. For instance, if the student’s most favorable two programs are already filled by better scoring students 
but his third most favorable program has an unfilled seat, we place him to his third most favorable program.   
Placement with COA:  
Step 1: We  pick  a  test  score  type.  Say  QS.  We  rank  the  students  with  respect  to  their  QS.  Then,  we  assign  
students to programs as we do in the one test type case. That is, we assign the student to his most favorable program 
given that the capacity is not already filled. Then, we follow the procedure with the other types of test scores. Note 
that the students may be assigned to more than one program. If this is the case, we change the preferences as 
follows. For all students who are assigned, we find their most preferred choice. For instance, if the student is placed 
to  his  second and fifth  choice,  the  best  assignment  for  this  student  is  his  second choice.   Then,  we erase  his  less  
favorable choices than this program. Then we continue to the next step.  
2 Student optimal algorithm (SOA) was first introduced by Gale–Shapley (1962) and there are many papers related to this 
algorithm. For example, Kesten (2008) finds a more efficient algorithm than SOA in the context of the Boston public school 
choice. Chen and Sönmez (2006), Calsamiglia et al. (2010) compares SOA with Boston public school choice system via 
experiments.
3 We study the problem of the effect of restricting the student to 24 choices in Do÷an and Yuret (2010).
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Step k: We redo the same procedure but with the preferences formed in step k-1.  If  there  are  no  students  with  
more than one program assigned, the algorithm stops. Otherwise, algorithm continues to step k+1. The assignments 
become final placements.   
Placement with SOA:   
Step 1: We only look at the first choices of the students. Some students have their first choice in a program that 
requires QS, others in a program that requires VS, etc. We sort the students who have their first choice in a program 
that requires QS with respect to their QS. We start from the student with the highest test score and continue till the 
student with lowest test score and apply the following procedure. If the student’s choice is already filled with 
students who have higher test scores than him, then we reject the student. If it is not filled, then we place the student 
to this first choice. We repeat this exercise for the other test types. If there is at least one student who is rejected, we 
change the preferences as follows. We delete the first choices of the rejected students. In the newly formed 
preferences, the rejected students second choice become their first choice, their third choice becomes their second 
choice etc. Then we move on to the next step.   
Step k: We repeat the algorithm that we described in step 1 with the preferences that are prepared in step k-1. If 
there are no rejected students, the algorithm stops and placements are final. If there are rejections, then we prepare 
the new preferences and move on to step k+1.
3. Data and Results 
There are more than 1.8 million students who take the ÖSS exam in 2005.  Only around 380 thousand students 
fill out preference lists which include a program in a college. The remaining students either cannot score above the 
threshold test score to be eligible to submit preference lists or decide to try their chances for the next year. Around 
half of the students who fill out the preference lists are placed in a program.
In section 2, we mention that, COA and SOA are equivalent if there is only one type of test score. Alternatively, 
if students have pure preferences then the algorithms are also equivalent. A student has a pure preference only if all 
his program choices require the same test type. For instance, if a student who has an engineering choice has all his 
other choices from QS programs, then we call his preferences pure. Otherwise, we refer to his preferences as mixed. 
Table 1 shows that students’ preferences are mostly mixed in this sense. In the first row of table 1, we consider all 
the students who state at least one QS program. Among them, 63% have pure preferences and do not state any VS, 
EW and FL programs. The students who states EW programs are mostly mixed. Merely 37% of them have a pure 
choice.  
Table 1. The percentage of students who have mixed and pure preferences
QS VS EW FL  
QS 0.63 0.00           0.37  0.00 
VS 0.00 0.41           0.57 0.01 
EW 
FL 
0.26 
0.00 
0.37 
0.07 
          0.37 
          0.06 
0.00 
0.87 
Now, we look at the relationship between preferences and comparative advantage. Since EW is in the most of the 
mixed preferences, we compare QS with EW (comparison of QS with VS also produces a similar result). We take 
students who have QS and EW choices and compute their comparative advantages by dividing their QS to their EW. 
Then we compute the percentage of QS choices. For instance, if a student has six EW choices and four QS choices, 
then the percentage of his QS choices is 40%. In figure 1, we see that as the comparative advantage in QS improves 
the percentage of QS choices increases and rapidly converges to 1. This implies a strong relationship between 
preferences and the comparative advantage. 
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 We use the Turkish student placement system data–set of year 2005 and determined the magnitude of the 
difference in the placements created by these algorithms. We see that the placement stays the same for all but six 
students. That is, it does not really matter whether one uses a student optimal algorithm as Balinski and Sönmez 
(1999) suggests or college optimal algorithm as ÖSYM applies. Since the comparative advantages and preferences 
of the students are on the same line, the two potentially different algorithms produce very similar results. 
Figure 1. Comparison of Comparative Advantage and Preference: QS to EW 
4. Conclusion  
We use the Turkish student placement system data–set of year 2005 and find that the SOA and COA produce the 
same results for all but six students. Given the large number of students who are placed by the algorithms, six is a 
very tiny number. We can say that SOA and COA produce almost the same result. This is because the students’ 
preferences are in the same line with colleges’ priorities.  Why a student who is good in math and science does not 
want to be in literature major? The reason is threefold. First, the student would be in a better engineering program 
than a literature program if his QS is better than his VS. He may choose to be in a good engineering program rather 
than stuck in a bad literature program despite his wishes to become a writer. Second, the student who wants to be a 
writer focuses on studying Turkish and not math or science when he prepares for the ÖSS test because the rewards 
for Turkish component are higher for literature programs. Therefore, the students who want to be writers lose their 
comparative advantage in QS. The students who want to be writers eventually become comparatively good at VS. 
Third, there is a positive correlation between the verbal capability and the desire to become a writer. Therefore, the 
students who are good at Turkish would also want to be writers. Therefore, the comparative advantage in VS and 
preference to be a writer are positively and strongly correlated. 
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